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Abstract
We develop and test the hypothesis that private information incorporated into stock
prices aﬀects the structure of corporate boards. Stock price informativeness may be
a complement to board monitoring, because the information revealed by prices can
be used by directors to monitor management. But price informativeness may also be
a substitute for board monitoring, because more informative prices can trigger ex-
ternal monitoring mechanisms, such as takeovers. We ﬁnd robust evidence for the
substitution eﬀect: Stock price informativeness, as measured by the probability of in-
formed trading (PIN), is negatively related to board independence. Consistent with
the model’s predictions, this relationship is particularly strong for ﬁrms exposed to
external governance mechanisms and internal governance mechanisms, and ﬁrms for
which ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is relatively unimportant. We address endogeneity con-
cerns in a number of diﬀerent ways and conclude that our results are unlikely to be
driven by omitted variables or reverse causality. The results are also robust to using
diﬀerent measures of price informativeness and diﬀerent proxies for board monitoring
JEL classiﬁcation: G32, G34
Keywords: Corporate boards, Independent directors, Price informativeness
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The idea that prices aggregate information that is dispersed among market participants
dates back to at least Hayek (1945). The modern version of such an idea is found in, among
others, the works of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985), in which the main role of
stock markets is the production and aggregation of information as a consequence of trading
between speculators and other types of (perhaps less informed) investors. The idea that
this type of information can also be useful for the provision of incentives in ﬁrms and for
the design of corporate governance mechanisms is an even more recent idea. Articles by
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) examine the role of
stock prices in disciplining managers and providing incentives to insiders. There is also a set
of related studies on the role of stock prices in guiding corporate investment decisions (Dow
and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), and Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel
(2007)).
In this paper, we argue that the information revealed by stock prices should aﬀect how
directors perform their monitoring of management. We identify two intuitive mechanisms
by which prices may aﬀect board monitoring. On the one hand, the information revealed by
stock prices allows external monitoring mechanisms to operate more eﬃciently. For example,
if prices fall due to the announcement of value-decreasing investments, the ﬁrm becomes a
cheaper takeover target. Managers who value control would thus avoid undertaking such
value-destroying projects. Thus, stock markets play an important monitoring role. On the
other hand, more informative prices bring new information to both markets and boards.
Directors may use the information revealed by stock prices as an input to their monitoring
task. Arguably, a better informed board of directors should be a better monitor.
In order to clarify these ideas, we develop a simple model of the relationship between
shareholders, markets, boards, and managers. The model predicts that price informativeness
matters for board monitoring, but that the sign of this relationship is ambiguous. Thus,
whether price informativeness and board independence are substitutes or complements is
1in the end an empirical question. Our model, however, has a number of unambiguous
predictions that we also explore in our empirical analysis.
A crucial assumption behind our theoretical analysis and our empirical strategy is that
diﬀerent stocks have diﬀerent amounts of information incorporated into them. This hetero-
geneity in price informativeness arises due to the diﬀerent costs of collecting and producing
private information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) predict that improving the cost-beneﬁt
trade-oﬀ of private information collection encourages more extensive informed trading and
leads to more informative pricing. They suggest that in a market with many risky stocks,
those which can be investigated more cheaply are more attractive to traders. As traders ac-
quire more information about such stocks, their prices become naturally more informative.
While the model helps us to identify the main hypotheses, our main contribution is
however on the empirical side. We ﬁnd a robust negative correlation between proxies for
price informativeness and board independence. This is a novel and surprising ﬁnding, and
one that, even without knowing the direction of causality, deserves further scrutiny.
We also test some of the implications of our model. We ﬁnd that the negative relationship
between price informativeness and board independence is particularly strong for ﬁrms with
few takeover defenses (that is, the ones for which the market is an eﬀective external monitor),
for ﬁrms with a high concentration of institutional ownership (for which large shareholder
monitoring is present), and for ﬁrms with low R&D expenses (which are less innovative ﬁrms,
for which ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is not crucial). These ﬁndings are all consistent with the
theory and, considered together, they increase our conﬁdence in the interpretation of the
results.
Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect methods to address
concerns about omitted variables. We also use instrumental variable (IV) methods to address
the possibility of reverse causality. As instruments, we use variables that are known to be
correlated with price informativeness, such as share turnover, S&P 500 membership, and
analyst coverage, but have never been used as explanatory variables in board independence
2regressions in previous studies. Although it is not possible to prove the validity of the
instruments, we provide a careful discussion of the advantages and limitations of our IV
approach. Finally, we show that using lagged versions of the price informativeness variable
also yields similar results.
In most of our empirical speciﬁcations, our measure of price informativeness is the prob-
ability of informed trading (PIN), which was developed in a series of papers beginning with
Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997). This measure
has strong theoretical foundations, since it comes from a structural microstructure model.
A high PIN indicates that more of the information incorporated into a stock’s price is com-
ing from private sources than public ones. Vega (2006) shows that stocks with higher PIN
have smaller reactions following an earnings announcement, which is consistent with the idea
that these stocks incorporate more private information and track their fundamental values
more closely. In a recent paper, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007a) adopt this measure to
assess the impact of price informativeness on corporate investment. They ﬁnd a positive
relation between PIN and the sensitivity of ﬁrm investment to stock prices, which supports
the hypothesis that managers learn from the private information incorporated into stock
prices. Our work provides complementary evidence on the importance of price information
for corporate decisions by focusing on the relationship between price informativeness and
governance mechanisms, which ultimately determine investment decisions.
A m o n gt h es e v e r a lr o b u s t n e s sc h e c k st h a tw ep e r f o r m ,w eu s ea l t e r n a t i v em e a s u r e so f
stock price informativeness, such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation (Morck, Yeung, and
Yu (2000)) and a measure of illiquidity or price impact of order ﬂow (Amihud (2002)). We
also investigate the impact of price informativeness on additional characteristics of the board
of directors. We ﬁnd that price informativeness is positively related to the number of directors
with attendance problems and negatively related to the number of board meetings. These
results are compatible with board monitoring and price informativeness being substitutes.
We also ﬁnd that price informativeness is negatively related to board size. This evidence
3is harder to interpret; while size has been sometimes considered detrimental to monitoring
(Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993)), it has also been linked to better advising and
strategy formation by boards (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Linck, Netter, and Yang
(2008)).
Overall, our results suggest that, empirically, board independence and price informa-
tiveness are substitutes rather than complements. There are few empirical studies on the
interaction of between diﬀerent governance mechanisms. Examples are the work of Cre-
mers and Nair (2005), who ﬁnd a complementary eﬀect between openness to the market
for corporate control and large institutional investors presence, and Gillan, Hartzell, and
Starks (2006), who ﬁnd that an independent board can act as a substitute for the market
for corporate control. Our paper adds to this growing literature.
Our results are also consistent with the idea that the optimal board structure depends
on the characteristics of the ﬁrm; that is, “one size” does not ﬁta l lﬁrms. In particular,
there is some evidence consistent with board structure being aﬀected by the degree of com-
plexity of ﬁrms’ operations and the trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of advising and
monitoring (Boone, Field, Karpoﬀ, and Raheja (2007), Coles et al. (2008), and Linck et al.
(2008)). Similarly, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) ﬁnd evidence that the stronger board
independence requirements mandated in 2002 beneﬁted large ﬁrms, while negatively aﬀect-
ing small ones. Finally, our work is also related to recent papers that investigate the impact
of corporate directors’ knowledge and expertise on ﬁrm outcomes (Guner, Malmendier, and
Tate (2006)) and the information available to and monitoring ability of independent directors
(Ravina and Sapienza (2006)).
On the theoretical side, our model integrates two independent lines of research. The
ﬁrst explains board structure as the result of optimal shareholder choices under incomplete
contracts (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Raheja (2005), Song and Thakor (2006), Adams
and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2007)). The second examines the role of stock
prices in disciplining managers and providing incentives to insiders (Holmstrom and Tirole
4(1993), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), and Almazan, Banerji, and Motta (2007)). To
the best of our knowledge, these two strands of the literature have never before been put
together.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model
to motivate the relationship between stock prices and board independence. The model is
used to derive the hypotheses that we test in subsequent sections. Section 3 describes the
sample, the data, and the construction of variables. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our core
evidence on the relationship between board independence and stock price informativeness.
In Section 6 we perform additional checks on the robustness of our ﬁndings. Section 7
concludes.
2. The Model
In a simple model, we show that there can be a link between the board’s monitoring role and
the price informativeness of a stock. Intuitively, more informative prices can reinforce the
internal monitoring activity performed by the board of directors. On the other hand, higher
price informativeness can also reinforce the role of external monitoring mechanisms, via
disciplining takeovers. Hence, board independence and price informativeness can interact as
either complements or substitutes. We examine this trade-oﬀ, and generate some empirical
predictions which are tested later in the paper.
2.1. The Setup
We model the need for monitoring of the CEO in a simple adverse selection setting (see for
example Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)) with three dates and four types of participants:
Shareholders, Board of Directors, CEO, and Stock Market. The sequence of events is as
follows. At date 0, the shareholders choose the composition of the board of directors (i.e.,
its level of independence i) and hire a CEO of an unknown type. At date 1, the type of
5the incumbent CEO may be revealed. With probability p (which can be interpreted as the
degree of price informativeness), stock prices reveal the CEO’s type to everyone. If prices
do not reveal the CEO’s type, the board alone learns it with probability β.I f t h e b o a r d
is informed, it may replace the CEO with a new one, whom is randomly selected from the
population. Likewise, if the market is informed, an external raider could also take over the
ﬁrm, replacing the CEO.1 At date 2, the value of the ﬁrm is revealed to everyone. The value
of the ﬁrm depends on the type of the CEO in charge.
There are two types j ∈ {H,L} of CEOs in this market. At date 0, the type of the
CEO is not known by anyone. For simplicity, we assume that both types are equally likely
in the population. The value of the ﬁrm, V j,w i l ld e p e n do nt h eq u a l i t yj of its CEO.
We assume V H >V L. The unconditional expected value of the ﬁrm when a new CEO is
appointed is then V E = 1
2
¡
V H + V L¢
.
The Board of Directors is characterized by its level of independence i.T h i s l e v e l i
corresponds to the probability of the board monitoring and replacing a CEO that is revealed
to be of type L at time 1.2 The board can learn about the type of the CEO at date 1 from
two sources: (1) stock prices or (2) own assessment. We assume that, even if the market is
uninformed, the board unilaterally learns the CEO’s type at date 1 with probability β.T h i s
is a very natural assumption: Insiders (i.e., the board) know more than outsiders.
Shareholders are risk-neutral agents who care about the market value of the ﬁrm and
delegate ﬁrm management to the CEO. Shareholders choose the composition of the ﬁrm’s
board of directors, i.e., its level of independence i ∈ [0,1]. This choice is non-trivial since
a more independent board is assumed to be costlier, but also generates more monitoring of
the CEO.3 We assume that board independence has an ex ante cost ki2
2 .
The Stock Price will be informative at date 1 with probability p,i nw h i c hc a s ei tr e v e a l s
1Aternative interpretations are also possible. For example, the CEO could have made wrong decisions
that could be reversed only if monitors intervene at this stage.
2More independent boards are likely to perform their monitoring role more eﬀectively and there is evidence
that outside directors can aﬀect crucial decisions such as hiring and ﬁring the CEO (Weisbach (1988)).
3For models that endogenize the cost of board independence, see Song and Thakor (2006) and Adams
and Ferreira (2007).
6the CEO’s type, which becomes public information. If the price does not reveal the type
of the CEO (with probability (1 − p)), or if it reveals that the CEO is of type H (with
probability
p
2), the probability of a takeover taking place is zero.4 Conditional on the market
being informed that the CEO is of type L (with probability
p
2), an external raider takes over
the ﬁrm and replaces its CEO with probability τ ∈ [0,1], which we interpret as a measure
of takeover threat (or an inverse measure of takeover defenses). If the market is informed
that the CEO is of type L, the board may also directly monitor and replace the CEO with
probability i.5 For simplicity, we assume that, at date 1, τ and i are independent from
each other. If both the board and the market want to replace the CEO simultaneously, we
assume that they ﬂip a coin. Because the outcome for the ﬁrm is the same regardless of who
monitors, it is not relevant to know the ultimate identity of the successful monitor.
In case the CEO is replaced at date 1, his successor is randomly drawn from the popula-
tion. Thus, conditional on the market and/or the board being informed, the CEO is subject
to monitoring and the ﬁrm’s expected value in such cases is deﬁned as V M = 1
2
¡
V H + V E¢
.
2.2. Board Independence and Price Informativeness
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4This assumption is not crucial. The model could easily accommodate a positive probability of a raider
acquiring information and placing a takeover bid, even if prices are uninformative.
5If prices reveal that the CEO is of type H, neither the market nor the board are interested in monitoring
and replacing the incumbent CEO.
7We are now able to establish a relationship between board independence and price informa-
tiveness:
Proposition 1 The optimal degree of board independence depends on the informativeness












The relationship between board independence and price informativeness is ambiguous:
The sign can be either positive or negative, depending on the values of the parameters. We
can interpret this result by examining the interaction of two intuitive eﬀects.
On the one hand, price informativeness and board monitoring can be complements —
the better informed the board is, the more eﬀective board monitoring becomes. This eﬀect
arises because price informativeness is a non-rival good that can be used by both insiders
and outsiders. This result is a robust one, and not speciﬁc to our model: The public good
nature of price informativeness would always generate a complementary eﬀect in any realistic
model.6
On the other hand, price informativeness can act as a substitute for board monitoring. A
better informed market can directly perform external monitoring via takeovers. This result
arises because internal and external monitoring both perform the same task of disciplining
the CEO. Any model in which internal monitoring is costly should predict a lower level of
board monitoring when there is an increase in the level of external monitoring (due to more
information being available in the market).
Turning to the parameters’ values, if τ + β>1, board independence and price informa-
tiveness are substitutes, i.e., there is a negative relationship between price informativeness
and board independence. Conversely, if τ + β<1, board independence and price informa-
6Gordon (2007) proposes the hypothesis that board independence and stock price informativeness are
complements. He claims that the monitoring advantages of independent directors are more clear in an
environment with increasing stock price informativeness as insiders lose their information advantage about
ﬁrm’s prospects.
8tiveness act as complements. Ultimately, ﬁnding out which eﬀect dominates is an empirical
question.
2.3. The Threat of a Takeover
The model allows us to predict, without ambiguity, the eﬀe c to ft h ed e g r e eo fe x p o s u r et o
takeover threats on the relationship between board independence and price informativeness.
More formally, we can state that:
Proposition 2 The higher is the likelihood of a takeover, the stronger (weaker) is the substi-











More external monitoring makes the substitution eﬀect between price informativeness and
board independence stronger. If a disciplining takeover is more likely when the market is
informed, there is less need for the monitoring role of the board of directors. Hence, we would
expect the level of board independence of those ﬁrms that are more exposed to the market
for corporate control to exhibit higher sensitivity to stock price informativeness. In sum, the
substitution eﬀect is stronger when takeover threats are more likely. This implication could
be tested by using takeover defenses as a proxy for the likelihood of takeovers (Ambrose and
Megginson (1992)).
2.4. The Role of Institutional Investors
There is evidence that institutional investors also perform an active role in corporate gov-
ernance (e.g., Hartzell and Starks (2003)). We examine the role played by institutional
investors in the relationship between board structure and price informativeness. We inter-
pret parameter k as a measure of how costly internal monitoring is. When institutional
9investors are present as large shareholders (or high concentration of institutional holdings),
it is likely that this cost of board monitoring is lower.
Proposition 3 The relationship between board independence and price informativeness is









We can see that (in absolute values) the relation between board independence and price
informativeness is less pronounced when the marginal cost of external monitoring k is higher
(i.e., when ∂i∗
∂p > 0, ∂2i∗
∂p∂k < 0, reducing the complementarity eﬀect; and when ∂i∗
∂p < 0,w eﬁnd
∂2i∗
∂p∂k > 0, reducing the substitution eﬀect). These results suggest that price informativeness
only signiﬁcantly aﬀects board independence when the board can eﬀectively act as an in-
ternal monitoring mechanism (lower monitoring cost k). We consider this scenario of lower
cost of board monitoring to be more likely in the presence of substantial concentration of
institutional shareholders who supervise the board themselves (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998)).
2.5. Firm-Speciﬁc Knowledge of the Board
If we consider β, the likelihood that the board learns information on its own, independently
from the market, as a parameter that reﬂects how easy it is for the board to gather ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information to assess the ability of the CEO, we can oﬀer the following interpretation
for the eﬀect of β on the board independence-informativeness relation:
Proposition 4 The higher is the likelihood of the board learning ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n ,
the stronger (weaker) is the substitution (complementary) eﬀect of price informativeness on











10Arguably, in more innovative ﬁrms (R&D-intensive ﬁrms), independent board members
should ﬁnd it harder to acquire ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge that is needed to assess the CEO’s
ability. According to our interpretation, these ﬁrms would have low β. This result suggests
that the (absolute value of the) eﬀect of price informativeness on board independence should
be stronger in ﬁr m sw i t hl o wR & Di nc a s et h eo v e r a l le ﬀect is negative, but weaker in case
the overall eﬀect is positive.
2.6. Discussion of the Main Assumptions
For the sake of simplicity and clarity of exposition, we have chosen a particular setting for
the model. We believe that the most relevant ingredients are present, but acknowledge that
in some instances they are oversimpliﬁed. One of the main simpliﬁc a t i o n si st h ef o r m a t i o n
of stock prices, which we treat as a black box. We could develop a detailed microstructure
model with endogenous price formation, but we believe that the current simple structure is
just suﬃcient to model the link between the composition of the board of directors and price
informativeness.
The way in which we model the board of directors is also simpliﬁed. We could have
followed the existing board literature by endogenizing all the costs and beneﬁts of board
monitoring. Since most of those results are now well known, we believe that replicating their
underlying analysis in unnecessary.
Finally, regarding the relationship between the ﬁrm and the CEO, we formulate the
agency problem as an adverse selection problem (as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)).
Alternatively, we could have presented a moral hazard problem (as in Dow and Raposo
(2005) and Adams and Ferreira (2007)), in which the incentives given to the CEO would be
an additional concern. Once again, since these results are well established in the literature,
we have chosen the adverse selection formulation in which the speciﬁc problem solved by the
CEO does not distract us from the main issues.
113. Sample and Variables
3.1. Measures and Determinants of Board Structure
Our main dependent variable is board independence, which is a proxy for the monitoring
intensity of the board. Board independence is proxied by the fraction of independent direc-
tors. In order for a director to qualify as independent, he must not be an employee, a former
executive, or a relative of a current corporate executive of the company. In addition, the
director must not have any business relations with the company.
In a later section, we consider other board structure variables. As alternative proxies
for the monitoring activity performed by the board of directors, we use the annual number
of regular board meetings and the fraction of directors with attendance problems (attend
less than 75% of board meetings). We also consider board size as deﬁned by the number of
directors on the board. We explore the idea that larger boards represent a larger pool of
expertise and thus provide better advice to managers that may substitute for the information
provided by stock markets. On the other hand, larger boards are usually considered less
eﬀective at monitoring due to coordination and free-riding problems.
In order to identify the eﬀect of price informativeness on the structure of corporate
boards, we need to control for other possible determinants of board structure. The literature
provides many suggestions in this regard. One hypothesis is that the scope and complexity
of operations aﬀect a ﬁrm’s board structure (Fama and Jensen (1983)). According to this
hypothesis, larger and more complex ﬁrms require larger boards. As a ﬁrm grows and
diversiﬁes, it faces an increasing demand for specialized board members who can perform
tasks such as managerial compensation and auditing. Furthermore, the scope and complexity
of operations can also have an eﬀect on board independence. Under this hypothesis, more
complex ﬁrms face larger agency costs and thus require additional board monitoring (Coles
et al. (2008)).
We consider three proxies to capture ﬁrms’ operational complexity: ﬁrm size (as measured
12by equity market capitalization), ﬁrm age (the number of years since the ﬁrm’s stock is
exchange-listed), and the number of business segments. We expect larger, older, and more
diversiﬁed ﬁrms to have a higher fraction of independent directors.
Many theories emphasize the importance of a ﬁrm’s business environment (Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2007)). We
use several control variables to capture some of the elements of these theories. To control for
the costs of outside monitoring, we take into account growth opportunities as proxied by the
market-to-book ratio and R&D expenditures, stock price volatility as proxied by the variance
of stock returns, and CEO stock ownership. We consider free cash ﬂow, leverage, proﬁtability,
and industry concentration, because these variables could be related to agency conﬂicts and
other opportunities for the CEO to extract private beneﬁts. Similarly, we include Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (GIM) as a measure of the number of takeover
defenses in the ﬁrm’s charter. We control for earnings quality as measured by the Dechow
and Dichev (2002) model as the quality of accounting numbers is a central element of the
information ﬂow. Others, in contrast, emphasize the negotiation between the CEO and
outside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)). We include two measures of the CEO’s
inﬂuence: CEO’s tenure and stock ownership. A more comprehensive discussion of some
of these variables and their relationship to board structures can be found in Boone et al.
(2007), Coles et al. (2008), Gillan et al. (2006), and Linck et al. (2008).
We introduce institutional ownership variables as additional controls in our empirical
speciﬁcations. Because the trading activity of large institutional investors may have a direct
eﬀect on the amount of private information revealed by stock prices, we expect institutional
ownership to be correlated with price informativeness. Because there is evidence that institu-
tional investors also perform an active role in corporate governance (e.g., Hartzell and Starks
(2003)), omitting the institutional ownership variables may lead to spurious correlations be-
tween price informativeness and board structure.7 Institutional investors are expected to
7There is some discussion in the literature over whether some types of institutions specialize in monitoring
and activism rather than trading. Research by Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Almazan, Hartzell,
13have more inﬂuence when they are large shareholders, because they have easier access to
board members (Carleton et al. (1998)) and beneﬁt from economies of scale in monitoring
activities. Thus, we consider two measures of concentrated holdings: the concentration of
institutional ownership (as measured by the Herﬁndahl index) and institutional blockholder
ownership (deﬁned as stock holdings by the ﬁrm’s largest institutional investors with at
least 5% of shares outstanding following Cremers and Nair (2005)). We also control for
the total institutional ownership (deﬁned as the percentage of shares outstanding held by
institutions).8
3.2. Measures of Price Informativeness
Our primary measure of stock price informativeness is the probability of information-based
trading (PIN) developed by Easley et al. (1996). This measure is based on a structural
market microstructure model, where trades may come from “noise traders” or from “informed
traders.” Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) provide a detailed theoretical description of
the PIN variable. Here we simply explain its intuition.
The trading process is modeled in the following way. At the beginning of each day, there
is a probability λ that some traders acquire new information about the fundamental value
of the ﬁrm. Trading orders arrive throughout the day according to three diﬀerent Poisson
distributions: informed trade orders come in at the average rate μ, uninformed buy orders
come in at the rate  b, and uninformed sell orders come in at the rate  s. The probability
that the opening trade of the day is information-based is given by
PIN =
λμ
λμ +  b +  s
, (7)
and Starks (2005), and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007b) show that “independent institutions” (mutual fund
managers and investment advisors) are eﬀective monitors, while “grey” institutions (bank trusts, insurance
companies, and other institutions) are not.
8We obtain similar results using alternative measures of concentrated holdings: ownership by the ﬁve
largest institutional investors; ownership by institutional blockholders (deﬁned as stock holdings by institu-
tional investors with at least 5% of shares outstanding); ownership by all blockholders; and ownership by
outside blockholders. We present some these results in the robustness section.
14where λμ is the arrival rate for informed orders and λμ +  b +  s i st h ea r r i v a lr a t ef o ra l l
orders.
Easley et al. (2002) use intra-day transaction data over a given period to estimate the
above parameters and thus the probability of informed trading in a stock. Notice that PIN
should be low for stocks with little ﬂuctuation in their daily buy and sell orders, which are
more likely to come from liquidity or noise trading. Likewise, PIN should be high for stocks
that display frequent large deviations from their normal order ﬂows.
Previous empirical work generally supports the use of PIN as a valid measure of the prob-
ability of informed trading and a proxy for stock price informativeness. Easley et al. (2002)
ﬁnd that the risk of private information trading is priced, and ﬁnd that it carries a positive
risk premium, i.e. stocks with higher PIN have higher expected returns. Vega (2006) shows
that stocks with higher PIN have smaller reactions following an earnings announcement,
which is consistent with the idea that these stocks incorporate more private information and
track their fundamental values more closely. PIN also seems to be related to managerial
decisions. Chen et al. (2007a) ﬁnd a positive relation between PIN and the sensitivity of
ﬁrm investment to stock prices, which supports the hypothesis that managers learn from the
private information incorporated into stock prices. Ferreira and Laux (2007) ﬁnd a positive
relation between strong corporate governance (few takeover defenses) and PIN, suggesting
that strong shareholder protection induces private information collection and trading by in-
formed market participants. All this empirical evidence supports the interpretation of PIN
as a valid measure of stock price informativeness.9
In a later section, we consider other price informativeness variables to conﬁrm our inter-
pretation of the results. We ﬁrst consider ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation as a measure
of price informativeness. Considerable research establishes that ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return
variation and price informativeness are closely related. French and Roll (1986) and Roll
9A recent paper by Duarte and Young (2007) questions this interpretation. Their ﬁndings suggest that
the relation between PIN and expected returns is explained by the fact that PIN is also a proxy of illiquidity
not related to private information.
15(1988) show that a signiﬁcant portion of stock return variation is not explained by market
movements. They suggest that ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e t u r nv a r i a t i o nm e a s u r e st h er a t eo fp r i v a t e
information incorporation into prices via trading. Empirical evidence supports the use of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation as a measure of stock price informativeness and particularly
of private information about ﬁrms. In the U.S. market, high levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e t u r n
variation are associated with more eﬃcient capital allocation (Durnev, Morck, and Yeung
(2004) and Chen et al. (2007a)), and with more information about future earnings embed-
ded in stock prices (Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003)). Cross-country patterns
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation also correspond to likely patterns of price informativeness.
Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) ﬁnd high ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation in
developed markets, but low ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation in emerging markets. Bris, Goetz-
mann, and Zhu (2007) ﬁnd high ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation in countries where short sales
are allowed.
We estimate annual ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation by regressing stock returns on the Fama
and French (1992) three-factor. For each ﬁrm-year, ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation is estimated
by 1 − R2 from the regression:
rit = αi + β1iRMt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + eit, (8)
using daily return data, where rit is the return of stock i in day t in excess of the risk-free
rate; RMt is the value-weighted excess local market return; SMBt is the small-minus-big
size factor return; and HMLt is the high-minus-low book-to-market factor return.10 Given














10The daily returns for the Fama and French (1992) small-minus-big
(SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) factors are drawn from French’s website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
16The variable Ψ measures ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation relative to market-wide varia-
tion, or lack of synchronicity with the market.11
Finally, as an alternative measure of price informativeness or private information incor-
porated into stock prices, we use the illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002). This measure is
deﬁned as the annual average of the daily ratio between a stock’s absolute return and its









where Di is the annual number of valid observation days for stock i;a n dV O L D it is the
dollar volume of stock i on day t. The illiquidity ratio gives the absolute (percentage) price
change per dollar of daily trading volume and is a proxy for the price impact of order ﬂow.
The magnitude of the price impact should be a positive function of the perceived amount of
informed trading on a stock (Kyle (1985)), although illiquidity will also reﬂect the inventory
costs associated with trading a given order size.
3.3. Sample
We start with ﬁrms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database between
1990 and 2001. The IRRC database contains detailed information on governance and director
characteristics for a large number of U.S. ﬁrms. We obtain board data for these ﬁrms from
Compact Disclosure for the 1990-1995 period and from IRRC for the 1996-2001 period.12
We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC codes 6000-6999). We winsorize variables at the bottom and
top 1% level.13 After these adjustments the number of ﬁrms in the sample is 2,188. Next we
11Alternative estimates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation are provided by the market model that assumes
β2i = β3i =0in equation (8) and by the two-factor (market and industry) model. We obtain similar ﬁndings
using these alternative estimates.
12We thank Tina Yang for helping us with the Compact Disclosure board data. While IRRC provides
detailed information on aﬃliation of directors, Compact Disclosure identiﬁes only whether the director is
an oﬃcer of the ﬁrm. Thus, board composition is only described in terms of the percentage of executive
directors (insiders or oﬃcers) and non-executive directors on the board. In the robustness section, we report
results using only IRRC data.that are consistent with our primary ﬁndings
13We obtain similar ﬁndings when we winsorize variables at the bottom and top 5% level.
17merge the IRRC database with our main variable of price informativeness — the probability
of information-based trading (PIN) for each ﬁrm-year, based on data from Easley et al.
(2002).14 The ﬁnal sample contains 1,443 ﬁrms and a total of 9,447 ﬁrm-year observations.
We obtain ﬁnancial and segment data from Compustat and stock returns and turnover
data from CRSP. The governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) (GIM) and board atten-
dance problems are available from the IRRC database. We obtain data on institutional
holdings and the number of analysts covering each ﬁrm from Thomson CDA/Spectrum In-
stitutional 13f Holdings and IBES. Blockholder ownership is based on data from Dlugosz,
Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006). Finally, we obtain additional director character-
istics such as CEO ownership and tenure and number of board meetings from ExecuComp.
Table 1 deﬁnes in detail the variables used in this study and describes their sources.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our data. The median fraction of independent
directors is 0.778. Board size ranges from 3 to 17 directors, with a median of 10 directors.
There are on average 7.2 board meetings a year and 2.5% of the directors have attendance
problems (attend less than 75% of board meetings).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of PIN. The mean (median) PIN is our sample is
0.162 (0.154), and the standard deviation is 0.056. These statistics are comparable to those
reported in Easley et al. (2002). The mean ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e t u r nv a r i a t i o n( 1 − R2)f r o mt h e
market model is 0.85, indicating that the market return factor accounts only for 15% of total
stock return variation. The mean illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) is 0.165.
The median ﬁrm in our sample has a market capitalization of $1.1 billion, an age of
39.9 years, and a leverage ratio of 27.0%. The mean number of business segments is 2.2,
the mean R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio is 1.9%, and the mean CEO ownership is 1.4%.
The median ﬁrm has 10 takeover defenses (out of a maximum of 24). The mean total
institutional ownership is 47.2% and the mean institutional blockholder ownership is 6.9%.
These statistics are comparable to those found in similar studies, such as those of Coles et al.
14The estimates of PIN are obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website:
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/data.htm.
18(2008) and Gillan et al. (2006).
4. Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trad-
ing
In this section we present our main results on the relation between board independence
and probability of informed trading (PIN). Speciﬁcally, we estimate the sign of the board
independence-informativeness relationship. In the next sections, we provide additional evi-
dence and perform several robustness checks.
Figure 1 presents a visual summary of the relation between board independence and
PIN. We ﬁrst sort ﬁrms into quintiles portfolios ranked by PIN. We then calculate the
average board independence within each quintile portfolio of PIN. The main ﬁnding in this
paper is clear from the ﬁgure: Average board independence for the lowest PIN portfolio
(Q1) is greater than the one for the highest PIN portfolio (Q5). The low-PIN portfolio
displays board independence of about 80%, while the corresponding ﬁgure for the high-PIN
portfolio is about 70%. The diﬀerence between the two extreme quintile portfolios is highly
statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic of 22.1). Moreover, all intermediate PIN portfolios present
lower board independence than the low-PIN portfolio.
In Table 3, we present the outcome of several ordinary least squares (OLS) panel re-
gressions, where the dependent variable y is a logistic transformation of the fraction of
independent directors z (i.e. y =l n ( z/1−z)). We use a logistic transformation because the
fraction of independent directors is bounded between zero and one.15 Our explanatory vari-
able of interest is the probability of information-based trading. Table 3 presents the results
from several speciﬁcations of the board independence regression, including one restricted to
the PIN and one with the full set of control variables. We always include industry (two-digit
15In the robustness section, we obtain similar results using the fraction of independent directors or the
logarithm of the fraction of independent directors as dependent variables.
19SIC) and year dummy variables.16 In our setting, cross-correlation and autocorrelation are
likely to occur in our dependent variable. When this happens, conventional standard errors
may be biased downwards. All reported t-statistics are therefore adjusted for heteroskedas-
ticity and within-ﬁrm correlation using clustered standard errors. In addition, the inclusion
of year dummies accounts for some forms of cross-sectional dependence.
Column (1) presents the coeﬃcients of a univariate regression between the fraction of
independent directors and PIN. There is strong evidence of a negative and signiﬁcant re-
lationship. The PIN coeﬃcient is -3.1376, with a high t-statistic of -13.60. This eﬀect is
economically signiﬁcant: an increase in PIN from the 20th percentile to the 80th percentile
(i.e., an increase in PIN from 0.11 to 0.21) predicts a decrease of roughly 6 percentage points
in board independence (for a board with average independence).
Controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics does not change this result qualitatively. In
column (2) we present estimates for a speciﬁcation that does include CEO ownership and
tenure as controls because these variables are not available for the 1990-1991 period. The
PIN coeﬃcient is -1.9860 with a t-statistic of -7.76. In column (3) we add CEO ownership
and tenure as controls, but the PIN estimate and t-stastistic are barely aﬀected. Overall,
we ﬁnd that the probability of informed trading displays a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant negative relationship with board independence.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, we ﬁnd that leverage, ﬁrm age, and the
number of business segments are all positively and signiﬁcantly related to board indepen-
dence. Firm size enters with a positive but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient (at the 5% level) in the
majority of speciﬁcations. These ﬁndings are consistent with the scope of the operations
hypothesis that more complex ﬁrms require more independent boards.
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008), we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant relationships between board independence and market-book ratio,
R&D expenditures, return-on-assets, and stock return variance. The free cash ﬂow variable
16We obtain similar results when we do not include industry or year dummies in the regression speciﬁcation.
20also does not have a statistically signiﬁcant point estimate. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients of CEO ownership and tenure are both negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which
is consistent with the suggestion of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) that board structure is
inﬂuenced by the negotiations between CEOs and outside directors. The evidence indicates
that board independence is negatively related to the degree of CEO inﬂuence.
In columns (4) - (6) we control for the governance index (GIM), total institutional own-
ership, and institutional ownership concentration. The GIM coeﬃcient is positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the idea that board independence increases in
ﬁrms that are insulated from the market for corporate control. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the empirical evidence of Gillan et al. (2006), who show that an independent board
can act as a substitute for the market for corporate control. The institutional ownership
variables are not signiﬁcantly related to board independence.
So far we have treated PIN as a continuous variable. We now take an alternative ap-
proach and classify ﬁrms as low PIN (low market monitoring) versus high PIN (high market
monitoring). Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a dummy variable that is equal to one for ﬁrm-years
with PINs above the 80th percentile (Q5) and zero for ﬁrm-years with PINs below the 20th
percentile (Q1). We re-estimate the board independence regressions in Table 3 using this
dummy variable. The estimated coeﬃcient on the PIN dummy variable measures the diﬀer-
ence in board independence between ﬁrms with high and low PIN, or price informativeness.
Notice that the intermediate observations in terms of PIN are not included in this regression.
Table 4 presents the results.
Column (1) presents the coeﬃcients of a univariate regression between the fraction of
independent directors and the PIN dummy variable (Q5 - Q1). There is strong evidence
of a negative and signiﬁcant relationship. The PIN dummy variable coeﬃcient is -0.5193,
with a high t-statistic of -13.08. This eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant: a move from the PIN
bottom quintile (Q1) to the top quintile (Q5) predicts a decrease of roughly 10 percentage
points in board independence (for a board with average independence). Controlling for other
21ﬁrm characteristics again does not change this result. In column (2), the PIN coeﬃcient is
-0.3404 with a t-statistic of -6.33.
In summary, we ﬁnd that the probability of informed trading displays a statistically and
economically signiﬁcant negative relationship with board independence.
5. Interpreting the Relationship between Board Inde-
pendence and Probability of Informed Trading
In the previous section we have found evidence of strong negative correlations between board
independence and the probability of informed trading (PIN). Our ﬁndings suggest that when
more information ﬂows to the market (via trading on private information) ﬁrms tend to
choose less independent boards. The interpretation is that when stock prices are more
revealing, the stock market acts as a substitute for corporate boards in its monitoring role.
In this section, we present additional results that strengthen this interpretation. In the
initial two subsections, we present evidence that takeover defenses and large shareholders
have an impact on the relationship between board independence and the probability of
informed trading. In the last subsection, we investigate the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
(proxied by research and development expenditures).
5.1. Takeover Defenses
If a ﬁrm adopts a large number of takeover defenses, it becomes partially insulated from the
market for corporate control. In such cases, the takeover market cannot play an eﬀective
disciplinary role. Our hypothesis is that the trade-oﬀ between board independence and price
informativeness is more relevant when there are few takeover defenses. This hypothesis is
implied by Proposition 2.
We use the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) (GIM) as a proxy for the number
of takeover defenses a ﬁrm has in place. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present the results
22of separate estimations on two subsets of the sample: ﬁrms whose GIM index is above 13
(column (1)) and ﬁrms whose GIM index is below 6 (column (2)).17 Following Gompers
et al. (2003), we label those ﬁrms with many takeover defenses as “dictatorship” ﬁrms and
those with few takeover defenses as “democracy” ﬁrms. Note that these two subsamples do
not include all observations in the sample. We ﬁnd that the relationship between board
independence and PIN is negative and signiﬁcant for democracy ﬁrms, but insigniﬁcant for
dictatorship ﬁrms. We conclude that the market for corporate control does have an important
role to play in shaping the relation between board independence and price informativeness.
Price informativeness can only substitute for the role of independent directors when the ﬁrm
is open to the market for corporate control (see Proposition 2). This ﬁnding is consistent
with the evidence provided by Gillan et al. (2006), who show that if a disciplining takeover
is more likely, then there is less need for board monitoring.
5.2. Institutional Ownership Concentration
If our theory is correct, shareholders should frequently intervene to change the board struc-
ture in response to exogenous changes in price informativeness. Our theory is thus less
plausible in dispersed ownership structures where shareholders have no incentive to engage
in activism. Unlike individual investors, institutional investors (especially if they hold large
blocks of stock) have a clear incentive to maximize the ﬁrm value by changing the board
structure when necessary. Thus, our hypothesis is that the trade-oﬀ between board indepen-
dence and price informativeness is more relevant when there are large shareholders or when
there is a higher concentration of institutional ownership. This is implied by Proposition 3.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present results on this hypothesis by splitting the sample
into ﬁrms with more or less concentrated institutional ownership. The high (low) insti-
tutional ownership concentration sample consists of those ﬁrms whose Herﬁndahl index is
greater (less) than the median value. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between
17To conserve space, we only present the results of our most complete speciﬁcation (column (5) in Table
III), but results are consistent for other speciﬁcations.
23board independence and PIN for the high institutional ownership concentration sample, but
this relationship is insigniﬁcant for ﬁrms with a low concentration of institutional owner-
ship. In other words, the probability of informed trading is only negatively related to board
independence for those ﬁrms with a high concentration of institutional ownership.18
The results of this section suggest that price informativeness can only be an eﬀective sub-
stitute for internal monitoring (by the board) when large institutional shareholders supervise
the board themselves. Without a substantial concentration of institutional ownership the
board may only play a minor role. In such cases it would be natural to ﬁnd no relation
between board independence and stock price informativeness.
5.3. Firm-SpeciﬁcK n o w l e d g e
It is reasonable to assume that ﬁrms facing high monitoring costs have less independent
boards. In particular, when ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is important, a board that is too in-
dependent may fail to obtain crucial information. Perhaps there are few informed insiders
(Raheja (2005)), or perhaps the CEO refuses to communicate with the board (Adams and
Ferreira (2007)). We thus expect that costs associated with the acquisition of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge may aﬀect the relationship between board structure and price informativeness.
Speciﬁcally, if stock markets can substitute for corporate boards as monitors of manage-
ment, we expect to ﬁnd a stronger negative relationship between board independence and
price informativeness when ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is less important. The idea is simply
that CEOs and inside directors possess more ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge than outside directors
(Fama and Jensen (1983)). Consequently, the trade-oﬀ between board independence and
price informativeness becomes less eﬀective when this type of knowledge is more important.
This hypothesis is formally derived in Proposition 4.
Measuring the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g ei sad i ﬃcult task. Following Coles
et al. (2008), we use R&D expenditures as a proxy for the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l -
18We obtain similar ﬁndings when we split the sample using the institutional blockholder ownership vari-
able.
24edge. Firm-speciﬁc knowledge is harder for outsiders to acquire in ﬁrms with high levels
of R&D expenditure. The kind of information that market prices convey cannot substitute
for the knowledge that insiders possess, thus, empirically, the substitution eﬀect should be
weaker for ﬁrms with high R&D.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 present the results of separate regressions for two sub-
s a m p l e st h a td i ﬀer from each other according to their R&D expenditures. In one set of ﬁrms,
the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets is above the 80th percentile (column (5)); all other
ﬁrms (low R&D and ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge) are placed in the other category (column (6)).19
The evidence shows that the relationship between board independence and PIN is negative
and signiﬁcant in low R&D ﬁrms, but statistically insigniﬁcant in high R&D ﬁrms. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that when ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is less impor-
tant, the private information revealed by stock prices can substitute for the monitoring role
of corporate boards. No such a trade-oﬀ is possible, however, when ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
is important.
6. Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of the relationship between board structure and
stock price informativeness. We ﬁrst present several alternative estimation methods, such
as instrumental variables (2SLS) and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The alternative estimation methods
address several concerns with our estimates, such as omitted variables, reverse causality,
and measurement errors. We then present additional robustness checks such as sample
variations and additional control variables. In the two ﬁnal subsections, we present results
using alternative measures of price informativeness and additional board-related variables.
19The 80th percentile actually corresponds to the median for ﬁrms with positive R&D expenditures as
only 40% of the observations have positive R&D. The ﬁndings are similar if we use the 75th percentile as
the cut-oﬀ.
256.1. Endogeneity and Alternative Estimation Methods
Endogeneity problems are ubiquitous in empirical research on corporate governance (e.g.,
Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2007)). In our setting, this problem is accentuated by recent
ﬁndings showing that CEO decision-making power and board size both have direct eﬀects
on corporate performance, in particular the variability of stock returns (Adams, Almeida,
and Ferreira (2005) and Cheng (2007)). Furthermore, there could be other reasons for board
structure and price informativeness to be jointly determined.
W eh a v ea l r e a d yd e a l tw i t hs o m eo ft h e s ei s s u e si nt h i sp a p e r .I no r d e rt ob es u r et h a to u r
measure of price informativeness is not simply capturing the eﬀect of stock return volatility,
we have included the total stock return variance as a control variable in all speciﬁcations.
More importantly, the eﬀect of PIN is robust even when stock return variance is one of the
controls. Furthermore, our analysis in Section 5 strongly supports an interpretation of the
results in which price informativeness causes board structure rather than vice-versa. The
reverse is diﬃcult to reconcile with corroborating evidence on the role of takeover defenses,
institutional ownership concentration, and ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e .
In this subsection, we ﬁrst address the potential endogeneity problems using instrumental
variables to control for the endogeneity of PIN; speciﬁcally, to address reverse causality issues.
This two-stage least squares (2SLS) method isolates the eﬀect of PIN on board independence.
To this end, we need a good instrument for PIN: a variable that is correlated with PIN (this
assumption can be tested), but uncorrelated with board structure except indirectly through
other independent variables. That is, the instrument should be a variable that can be
“excluded” from the original list of control variables without aﬀecting the results. This last
requirement cannot be tested by statistical methods; it is, in the end, an act of faith. Since
PIN is estimated using intra-day stock trading data, ﬁnding an appropriate instrument is
not an easy task. We use analyst coverage, share turnover, and S&P 500 membership as
instruments.
Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998) suggest that analysts may serve to turn private
26information into public information and do not have signiﬁcant ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n .
Analysts may attract additional uninformed order ﬂow to a stock, an eﬀect that would
also reduce PIN. Empirical evidence seems to support a negative relation between price
informativeness and analyst coverage (Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed
(2006)). Further, Chen et al. (2007a) ﬁnd a negative relation between PIN and the sensitivity
of ﬁrm investment to stock prices, which suggests that information released by analysts and
impounded in the stock price does not have much eﬀect on managers’ investment decisions.20
Share turnover is also likely to be negatively related to PIN, again consistent with the notion
that stocks with greater trading activity tend to have more uninformed order ﬂow (Easley
et al. (2002)). We use as an additional instrument a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if a stock included in the S&P 500 index as these ﬁrms tend to attract more investor
attention. Thus, our instrumental variables have been previously found to be signiﬁcantly
correlated with price informativeness, but have never been used as explanatory variables in
board independence regressions in previous studies.21
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage regression that uses
PIN as dependent variable. The results support the conclusion that turnover and analyst
coverage are negatively and signiﬁcantly related to PIN, while S&P 500 membership is pos-
itively and signiﬁcantly related to PIN. Columns (2) and (3) present the 2SLS coeﬃcients
of the second-stage regression that uses board independence as dependent variable. There
is still evidence of a negative relation between board independence and PIN after taking
into account the possibility that PIN is endogenous. Assuming that our instruments are
valid (i.e., we assume that all these instruments aﬀect price informativeness but not board
independence directly), the evidence suggests the existence of a causal link from price in-
20There are some papers that examine whether analysts serve as an additional external monitoring mech-
anism. Some studies argue that analysts positively impact ﬁrm performance and polices (Knyazeva (2007),
Yu (2007)), while others ﬁnd evidence that excess analyst coverage induce overinvestment and external ﬁ-
nancing (Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006)). In unreported results, we ﬁnd that analyst coverage does not
aﬀect the negative and signiﬁcant relation between board independence and price informativeness.
21Following Agarwal and O’Hara (2006), we also use lagged PIN as an instrument and obtain consistent
results (not tabulated here). See Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and OŠHara (2006) for a discussion of altenative
instruments for PIN.
27formativeness to board structure. To formally assess the quality of the instruments, we also
perform the Hansen X 2-test of instrument orthogonality. This statistic jointly tests the null
hypotheses of correct model speciﬁcation and orthogonality of instruments with the errors.
Our instruments perform adequately in our tests (p-value is 0.62 and 0.95 in the speciﬁcations
of columns (2) and (3) respectively), indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
instrument suitability.
We then use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that control for unobserved sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity
and the endogeneity of PIN as an alternative to 2SLS. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 present
the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates (with t-statistics adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering). There is
still evidence of a negative relation between board independence and PIN. In column (5), the
estimate of the PIN coeﬃcient is -0.5812 with a signiﬁcant t-statistic of -3.28. Thus, the ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates suggest a casual negative relation from PIN to board independence.
A ﬁnal approach to address the endogeneity concern is to use lagged PIN as explanatory
variable. Columns (6) and (7) present the results of these estimations that conﬁrm a negative
relation between board independence and PIN.
All of our speciﬁcations so far have been estimated by OLS. To address the concern
that outliers may drive our core results, we winsorize ﬁnancial ratios at the bottom and
top 1% levels. We use least-absolute deviation (median) regressions as an alternative means
of addressing the diﬃculties associated with outliers. The results are presented in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 7, and remain consistent with a negative relationship between board
independence and PIN.
The presence of time dependence and cross-sectional dependence in our data is also of
potential concern. Our results so far account for cross-sectional and time dependence using
industry and year dummies, and by computing ﬁrm-clustered standard errors. An alternative
solution is to use the procedure of Fama-MacBeth. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the relationship
between board structure and PIN separately for each sample year and report the average of
the yearly estimated coeﬃcients.
28Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 present the results of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. The
coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. The level of economic and
statistical signiﬁcance is also similar to that reported in Table 3. In column (7), the PIN
coeﬃcient is -1.1203, with a t-statistic of -7.71. The coeﬃcients of other ﬁrm characteristics
are also consistent with the OLS panel regression estimates.
6.2. Additional Robustness Checks
This subsection discusses several additional robustness checks. These results appear in Table
8. With these results, we check that our ﬁndings are robust to the sample period, board in-
dependence variable deﬁnition, and control variables. To conserve space, we only present the
results of our most complete speciﬁcation (column (5) in Table 3), but results are consistent
for other speciﬁcations.
Column (1) uses the 1996-2001 sample period, rather than 1990-2001. The 1996-2001
period corresponds to the period for which the IRRC directors data are available. Therefore,
column (1) uses only IRRC directors data, rather than Compact Disclosure (1990-1995) and
IRRC data (1996-2001). This issue is a potential concern because the Compact Disclosure
just characterize the board in terms of executive and non-executive directors. In addition,
c o l u m n( 2 )u s e sb o a r dd a t af r o mC o m p a c tD i s c l o s u r ef o rt h ew h o l es a m p l ep e r i o d( 1 9 9 0 -
2001) as an alternative to the IRRC directors data.
Column (3) uses the logarithm of board independence, rather than the logistic transfor-
mation, as dependent variable. Column (4) uses board independence as dependence variable.
Theses check that our results are not driven by our particular transformation of board inde-
pendence.
Column (5) reports results that control for blockholder ownership that considers all types
of blockholders rather than only institutional investors. Column (6) reports results that
control for outside blockholders ownership rather than only 13F institutional investors. These
blockholder ownership is taken from Dlugosz et al. (2006) and covers the 1996-2001 sample
29period.
Column (7) presents results that take into account product market competition. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) suggest that product market competition is one of the most eﬀective
mechanism to eliminate managerial ineﬃciency. We try to capture the competitive structure
of an industry using industry concentration, calculated as the sum of squared market shares
of all ﬁrms in each industry (two-digit SIC) in each year (Herﬁndahl index). Industries
with lower Herﬁndahl indices possess more competitive product markets. The industry
concentration variable has indeed a positive coeﬃcient but insigniﬁcant at the 5% level.
Column (8) presents results that control for earnings quality or accounting quality. Earn-
ings quality is measured by the annual absolute value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc residuals from an in-
dustry regression of total accruals on lagged, contemporaneous, and leading cash ﬂow from
operations (Dechow and Dichev (2002)). This variable is an inverse index of accounting qual-
ity, in that they increase in the magnitude of unexpected accruals. There is some evidence
of a positive association between board independence and accounting quality.
Finally, column (9) includes lag board size as an additional control variable following
Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008), Gillan et al. (2006).
In all models, the probability of informed trading coeﬃcient remains negative and strongly
signiﬁcant. Our basic result is conﬁrmed: more private information trading is strongly asso-
ciated with less board independence, or in other words, with less need for board monitoring.
6.3. Alternative Measures of Price Informativeness
To substantiate our informational interpretation of the board independence-PIN relationship,
we next test for the relation between board independence and several alternative measures
of private information ﬂow. To begin, we use ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation, or non-
synchronicity of stock returns, as one alternative to the probability of informed trading in
proxying for the intensity of private information ﬂo w i n gt oas t o c k ’ sm a r k e t( M o r c ke ta l .
(2000)). Firm-speciﬁc return variation is measured by the annual estimate of 1 − R2 of the
30three-factor model of Fama and French (1992) model using daily return data within each
year as detailed in the data section.
Trading is theoretically linked to the quality or extent of private information (e.g., Blume,
Easley, and O’Hara (1994)), and is thus a natural measure of private information ﬂow. Specif-
ically, we investigate the illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002). This ratio gives the absolute
(percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume and is a proxy for the price
impact of order ﬂow.
We estimate board independence regressions similar to those in Table 3 using ﬁrm-speciﬁc
return variation and the illiquidity ratio, rather than PIN, as measures of private information
incorporated into stock prices. Table 9 reports the results for a speciﬁcation that does not
include CEO ownership and tenure as controls because these variables are not available for
the 1990-1991 period and for our most complete speciﬁcation in Table 3.
Columns (1) and (2) report results for the logistic transformed ﬁrm-speciﬁc return varia-
tion regression (Ψ). We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on Ψ is negative and signiﬁcant. Thus, the
evidence is that board independence is lower in stocks of ﬁrms that are less synchronized
with the market or that incorporate more private information.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 present estimates using the annual illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ)
as measure of private information ﬂow. ILLIQ is also negatively related to board indepen-
dence, which supports our hypothesis that ﬁrms more subject to private information trading
(or higher price impact) have less independent boards.
Overall, the results using alternative proxies of price informativeness conﬁrm our ba-
sic ﬁnding of a substitute relation between corporate boards and stocks markets in their
monitoring role.
6.4. Additional Board-Related Variables
The evidence of a negative relationship between board independence and the probability of
informed trading is clear. We now turn to the question of whether price informativeness is
31similarly related to other variables that are also related to board monitoring.
We ﬁrst use the annual number of board meetings as a dependent variable. It has been
argued that a board that meets more often is likely to be a better monitor (e.g. Vafeas
(1999)). In Table 10, columns (1) and (2) present the estimates of OLS panel regressions in
which the logarithm of the number of board meetings is the dependent variable. We ﬁnd a
negative relationship between the number of board meetings and the probability of informed
trading. If board meetings are seen as increasing in the board’s monitoring intensity, this
result is compatible with board monitoring and price informativeness being substitutes.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires corporations to list in their proxy state-
ments the name of each director who attended fewer than 75% of the number of board
meetings and board committees meetings on which he served while a director. A board
with a higher fraction of directors with attendance problems is likely to be a poor monitor.
Columns (3) and (4) present the estimates of panel regression, where the annual fraction of
directors with attendance problems is the dependent variable. We ﬁnd a positive relation
between the board’s attendance problems and the probability of informed trading. Again,
this result is compatible with board monitoring and price informativeness being substitutes.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) present the outcome of regressions in which the dependent
variable is the logarithm of board size. We use the log because board size is bounded below
by zero. There is evidence of a negative and signiﬁcant relation between board size and PIN.
Most of the other ﬁrm-level characteristics enter with their expected signs, and are usually
consistent with the literature on board structure determinants (e.g. Boone et al. (2007) and
Linck et al. (2008)).
It has been argued that larger boards are poor monitors (Lipton and Lorsch (1992),
Jensen (1993)). However, some also argue that larger boards are more diverse and produce
more specialized advice to managers (Coles et al. (2008), Linck et al. (2008)). Thus, although
the evidence that we ﬁnd is interesting, it is diﬃcult to interpret. It should also be noted
that size and independence are positively correlated in the sample.
327. Conclusion
In this paper, we add a new and important element to the list of determinants of board
structure − price informativeness. We develop and test the hypothesis that the amount of
private information incorporated into stock prices aﬀects the structure of corporate boards,
in particular board independence.
We ﬁnd robust empirical evidence that stock price informativeness, as measured by the
probability of informed trading (PIN) and other proxies, is negatively related to board in-
dependence. Consistent with the theory that we propose, this negative relationship is par-
ticularly strong for ﬁrms with few takeover defenses. We also ﬁnd that eﬀective internal
monitoring such as that provided by institutional investors seems to be a condition for the
existence of a trade-oﬀ between corporate boards and price informativeness. Finally, the
negative relation between corporate boards and price informativeness is particularly strong
for ﬁrms with less ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. In this case, outside investors and independent
board members are more likely to succeed as eﬀective monitors.
We show that if stock prices are informative, stock markets are able to perform a moni-
toring role like that normally associated with the board of directors. When prices are infor-
mative it is also more likely that investors are able to monitor an ill-performing management
team and directly intervene if necessary (via takeovers). For this reason, an informed stock
market can also perform the monitoring role of the board of directors.
We thus predict that more informative prices lead to a less demanding board structure,
with a lesser degree of independence, less board meetings, weaker attendance to board meet-
ings, and smaller size.
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Fraction of independent directors Ratio of number of independent directors by board size (1990-1995 data from Compact Disclosure
and 1996-2001 data from IRRC).
Board size Number of board members (IRRC).
Number of board meetings Number of board meetings by year (EXECUCOMP).
Board attendance problems Ratio of directors that attended less than 75% of board/committee meetings by board size (IRRC).
Probability of informed trading Annual probability of information-based trading (PIN) of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).
Probability of informed trading dummy (Q5 - Q1) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a ﬁrm-year is in the top (Q5) PIN quintile and zero in the
bottom (Q1) PIN quintile.
Firm-speciﬁc return variation 1 − R2 of the Fama-French three-factor regression model using daily stock returns.
Illiquidity Average daily ratio of a stock absolute return by the dollar volume (Amihud (2002) price impact measure).
Firm size Market capitalization in $ millions (COMPUSTAT: item 25 × item 199).
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets (COMPUSTAT: (item 9 + item 34) / item 6).
Firm age Number of years since the stock inclusion in the CRSP database.
Number of business segments Number of business segments in which ﬁrm operates (COMPUSTAT).
Market-to-book Ratio of market value of equity by book value of equity (COMPUSTAT: item 25 × item 199 / item 60).
R&D expenditures Ratio of R&D expenditures by total assets (COMPUSTAT: item 46 / item 6).
Stock return variance Annualized stock return variance estimated each year with daily stock returns (CRSP).
Free cash ﬂow Ratio of operating income before depreciation minus capital expenditures by total assets
(COMPUSTAT: (item 13 − item 128) / item 6).
Return-on-assets Ratio of operating income before depreciation by total assets (COMPUSTAT: item 13 / item 6).
CEO ownership Number of shares held by CEO divided by number of shares outstanding (EXECUCOMP).
CEO tenure Number of years since the date the director became CEO (EXECUCOMP).
Governance index (GIM) Governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions (IRRC).
Institutional ownership Number of shares held by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding (Thomson 13f Holdings).
Institutional Herﬁndahl Institutional Herﬁndahl index calculated using institutional ownership.
Institutional blockholder ownership Number of shares held by the ﬁrm’s largest institution with at least 5% of shares divided by the number of shares
outstanding (Thomson 13f Holdings)
Blockholder ownership Number of shares held by all blockholders divided by the number of shares oustanding
(Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006)).
Outside blockholder ownership Number of shares held by outside blockholders divided by the number of shares oustanding
(Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006)).
Industry concentration Industry Herﬁndahl index calculated as the sum of squared market shares of ﬁrms’ sales (COMPUSTAT: item 12)
in the ﬁrm’s industry (two-digit SIC).
Earnings quality Absolute value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc residuals from a annual industry regression (two-digit SIC) of total accruals on
lagged, contemporaneous, and leading cash ﬂow from operations; variables scaled by total assets.
Share turnover Number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding (CRSP).
Number of analysts Number of analysts covering a ﬁrm (IBES).
S&P 500 membership Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a ﬁrm is a member of the S&P 500 index, zero otherwise.
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Summary Statistics
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and number of observations for each
variable. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial
industries are omitted (SIC 6000-6999).
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N
Fraction of independent directors 0.753 0.778 0.135 0.100 0.955 9,447
Board size 9.819 10.000 2.798 3.000 17.000 9,447
Number of board meetings 7.282 7.000 2.689 3.000 16.000 6,233
Board attendance problems 0.025 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.250 4,922
Probability of informed trading 0.162 0.154 0.056 0.068 0.357 9,447
Firm-speciﬁc return variation 0.738 0.756 0.101 0.424 0.917 14,661
Illiquidity 0.165 0.009 0.706 0.000 6.881 13,957
Firm size 3,819 1,079 7,989 14 51,179 9,236
Leverage 0.274 0.270 0.176 0.000 0.919 9,228
Firm age 32.026 39.917 15.758 1.167 50.917 9,447
Number of business segments 2.158 1.000 1.461 1.000 6.000 9,447
Market-to-book 2.861 2.063 2.979 0.528 23.957 9,236
R&D expenditures 0.019 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.368 8,774
Stock return variance 0.173 0.113 0.206 0.012 2.189 9,447
Free cash ﬂow 0.076 0.079 0.090 -0.447 0.332 9,086
Return-on-assets 0.145 0.141 0.082 -0.352 0.409 9,241
CEO ownership 0.014 0.001 0.042 0.000 0.251 9,447
CEO tenure 4.257 1.000 6.318 0.000 27.000 9,447
Governance index (GIM) 9.433 10.000 2.746 3.000 15.000 8,404
Institutional ownership 0.472 0.524 0.260 0.000 0.914 9,447
Institutional Herﬁndahl 0.067 0.050 0.073 0.000 0.477 9,447
Institutional blockholder ownership 0.069 0.070 0.063 0.000 0.282 9,447
Blockholder ownership 0.192 0.162 0.184 0.000 0.663 5,235
Outside blockholder ownership 0.136 0.096 0.148 0.000 0.557 5,235
Industry concentration 0.128 0.097 0.120 0.026 1.000 9,447
Earnings quality 0.100 0.056 0.127 0.005 0.578 7,783
Share turnover 0.909 0.727 0.699 0.068 8.136 9,447
Number of analysts 8.322 6.000 8.205 0.000 31.000 9,447
S&P 500 membership 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 9,294
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Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading
Estimates of OLS panel regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors are shown. Refer
to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries
are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of informed trading -3.1376 -1.9860 -1.8604 -1.5294 -1.5383 -1.5299
(-13.60) (-7.76) (-6.81) (-5.08) (-5.15) (-5.08)
Firm size (log) 0.0259 0.0193 0.0226 0.0224 0.0226
(1.79) (1.34) (1.48) (1.44) (1.47)
Leverage 0.4392 0.3749 0.3177 0.3214 0.3214
(4.33) (3.81) (3.01) (3.01) (3.01)
Firm age (log) 0.1566 0.1521 0.1030 0.1063 0.1068
(7.05) (7.01) (3.98) (4.11) (4.12)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0997 0.1059 0.0854 0.0854 0.0860
(4.14) (4.62) (3.64) (3.65) (3.67)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0066 0.0136 0.0164 0.0171 0.0178
(0.28) (0.56) (0.64) (0.67) (0.70)
R&D expenditures 0.1626 -0.1125 -0.1309 -0.1113 -0.1119
(0.40) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.26)
Stock return variance -0.0723 -0.0453 -0.0246 -0.0292 -0.0240
(-1.27) (-0.76) (-0.40) (-0.47) (-0.39)
Free cash ﬂow 0.3023 0.3778 0.1244 0.1178 0.1204
(1.05) (1.34) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40)
Return-on-assets -0.5283 -0.5507 -0.3896 -0.3930 -0.3977
(-1.56) (-1.67) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.15)
CEO ownership -2.3059 -1.8691 -1.8684 -1.8792
(-6.54) (-4.91) (-4.89) (-4.95)
CEO tenure -0.0044 -0.0058 -0.0059 -0.0058
(-1.73) (-2.24) (-2.30) (-2.28)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0400 0.0402 0.0399
(6.03) (6.03) (5.97)




Institutional blockholder ownership 0.2929
(0.96)
R2 0.082 0.144 0.166 0.163 0.164 0.164
N 9,447 8,610 7,504 6,740 6,740 6,740
43Table 4
Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading Quintiles
Estimates of OLS panel regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors are shown. Refer
to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries
are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of informed trading dummy (Q5 - Q1) -0.5193 -0.3404 -0.3399 -0.2708 -0.2746 -0.2702
(-13.08) (-6.33) (-6.12) (-4.59) (-4.66) (-4.57)
Firm size (log) 0.0187 0.0115 0.0205 0.0211 0.0203
(1.06) (0.65) (1.09) (1.11) (1.08)
Leverage 0.3937 0.3896 0.3286 0.3319 0.3328
(3.25) (3.07) (2.42) (2.42) (2.43)
Firm age (log) 0.1965 0.1881 0.1518 0.1572 0.1576
(7.25) (6.76) (4.49) (4.60) (4.61)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0707 0.0683 0.0418 0.0413 0.0418
(2.48) (2.48) (1.53) (1.51) (1.53)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0084 0.0124 0.0103 0.0100 0.0112
(0.29) (0.42) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35)
R&D expenditures 0.4071 0.3513 0.5496 0.5686 0.5564
(0.73) (0.64) (0.89) (0.92) (0.90)
Stock return variance -0.0606 0.0069 0.0329 0.0243 0.0302
(-0.77) (0.08) (0.33) (0.25) (0.31)
Free cash ﬂow 0.3559 0.4728 0.1206 0.1139 0.1219
(1.06) (1.36) (0.31) (0.30) (0.32)
Return-on-assets -0.6032 -0.8197 -0.6705 -0.6639 -0.6833
(-1.58) (-2.05) (-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.64)
CEO ownership -1.9879 -1.6861 -1.7101 -1.7090
(-3.74) (-3.03) (-3.06) (-3.06)
CEO tenure -0.0041 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0066
(-1.31) (-2.13) (-2.15) (-2.15)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0396 0.0394 0.0389
(4.93) (4.88) (4.83)




Institutional blockholder ownership 0.2308
(0.58)
R2 0.137 0.199 0.204 0.186 0.188 0.187
N 3,815 3,471 3,044 2,735 2,735 2,735
44Table 5
Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading: The Role of
Takeover Defenses, Institutions and Firm-SpeciﬁcK n o w l e d g e
Estimates of OLS panel regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors are shown. The
Dictatorship and Democracy samples consist of those ﬁrms whose governance index (GIM) is above 13 and below
6. The High (Low) institutional ownership Herﬁndahl sample consists of those ﬁrms whose institutional ownership
Herﬁndahl index is greater than the 80th percentile and smaller than the 20th percentile. The High (Low) R&D
sample consists of those ﬁr m sw h o s er a t i oo fR & De x p e n d i t u r e st oa s s e t si sa b o v e( b e l o w )t h e8 0 t hp e r c e n t i l e .
Refer to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries
are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dictatorship Democracy High Inst. Low Inst. High Low
(high GIM) (low GIM) Herﬁndahl Herﬁndahl R&D R&D
Probability of informed trading 0.1013 -1.4477 -1.2607 -0.2797 -0.7576 -1.4648
(0.08) (-2.08) (-2.72) (-0.50) (-1.21) (-5.05)
Firm size (log) 0.0506 0.0269 0.0164 0.0520 0.0311 0.0439
(0.98) (0.67) (0.63) (1.63) (1.02) (2.66)
Leverage 0.6190 0.5675 0.4331 -0.0773 -0.0648 0.3444
(1.77) (2.46) (2.90) (-0.39) (-0.34) (2.89)
Firm age (log) -0.0633 0.1009 -0.0199 0.1365 0.1208 0.0945
(-0.54) (1.52) (-0.46) (2.46) (2.00) (3.21)
Number of business segments (log) 0.1299 0.1851 0.1720 0.0418 0.1571 0.0592
(1.44) (2.55) (3.95) (0.92) (3.10) (2.30)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0046 0.0324 0.0821 -0.0017 0.0275 0.0327
(0.06) (0.61) (2.18) (-0.04) (0.69) (1.31)
R&D expenditures 3.8049 0.2791 -0.4451 1.1160 0.1360 3.8646
(1.81) (0.21) (-0.60) (1.34) (0.18) (1.62)
Stock return variance -0.0877 -0.0210 0.1380 -0.2239 -0.0423 0.0237
(-0.24) (-0.07) (1.74) (-1.49) (-0.25) (0.36)
Free cash ﬂow 0.5184 -0.9381 -0.2632 0.4504 0.2941 -0.0154
(0.48) (-1.37) (-0.61) (0.84) (0.38) (-0.05)
Return-on-assets -0.2561 1.1769 0.2768 -0.3990 -0.4283 -0.2363
(-0.18) (1.45) (0.55) (-0.67) (-0.54) (-0.60)
CEO ownership -3.2201 -1.8107 -1.1028 -3.3888 -2.4752 -1.7124
(-2.03) (-2.72) (-2.25) (-2.38) (-1.51) (-4.31)
CEO tenure -0.0043 0.0001 0.0081 0.0005 -0.0083 -0.0050
(-0.57) (0.02) (1.48) (0.09) (-1.43) (-1.74)
Governance index (GIM) 0.1700 0.0887 0.0636 0.0206 0.0378 0.0392
(2.24) (1.36) (5.27) (1.72) (3.13) (5.06)
Institutional ownership 0.3807 0.0856 0.1868 -0.2233 0.1975 0.0446
(1.91) (0.46) (1.46) (-0.80) (1.56) (0.66)
Institutional Herﬁndahl -1.4804 -0.3847 0.4562 1.4879 0.3998 0.2157
(-1.90) (-0.86) (1.77) (0.19) (0.88) (0.86)
R2 0.409 0.424 0.282 0.234 0.260 0.203
N 437 615 1,342 1,255 1,305 5,433
45Table 6
Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading: Endogeneity
Estimates of regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors using alternative estimation
methods are shown. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel regression uses share turnover, analyst coverage,
and S&P 500 membership as instruments for PIN. Column (1) presents ﬁrst-stage regression estimates with PIN
as dependent variable. Columns (2) and (3) present second stage regression estimates with the logistic transformed
fraction of independent directors as dependent variable. Columns (4) and (5) present estimates of panel regression
with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (6) and (7) present estimates of panel regression using lagged PIN as explanatory
variable. Refer to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Finan-
cial industries are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics
adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2SLS Firm ﬁxed Lag PIN
First Second Second eﬀects
stage stage stage
Probability of informed trading (PIN) -8.8139 -6.7872 -0.6940 -0.5812 -1.6905 -1.3691
(-2.70) (-2.37) (-3.58) (-2.62) (-6.47) (-4.76)
Firm size (log) -0.0232 -0.1375 -0.0849 0.0738 0.0683 0.0297 0.0258
(34.67) (-1.75) (-1.38) (3.02) (2.60) (2.08) (1.71)
Leverage -0.0154 0.3395 0.2374 0.3394 0.2417 0.4344 0.3130
(3.42) (3.16) (2.12) (3.14) (2.05) (4.18) (2.89)
Firm age (log) -0.0045 0.1303 0.0937 0.4413 0.6101 0.1595 0.1042
(4.92) (5.02) (3.57) (8.09) (6.11) (6.97) (3.99)
Number of business segments (log) -0.0056 0.0645 0.0702 0.0150 0.0118 0.1024 0.0853
(5.77) (2.15) (2.71) (0.77) (0.60) (4.27) (3.61)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0042 0.0370 0.0385 0.0098 -0.0120 0.0080 0.0194
(3.64) (1.43) (1.42) (0.44) (-0.53) (0.32) (0.76)
R&D expenditures 0.0191 0.2163 0.0431 -0.4203 -0.5590 0.0910 -0.2403
(1.00) (0.51) (0.10) (-0.88) (-0.83) (0.22) (-0.54)
Stock return variance -0.0277 -0.3181 -0.2118 0.2085 0.1374 -0.0746 -0.0339
(8.10) (-2.58) (-1.75) (3.91) (2.10) (-1.23) (-0.54)
Free cash ﬂow -0.0135 0.2832 0.1315 -0.1143 -0.2661 0.2094 0.0630
(1.38) (0.98) (0.43) (-0.59) (-1.06) (0.69) (0.21)
Return-on-assets 0.0091 -0.5447 -0.4459 0.0063 0.1705 -0.4355 -0.3423
(0.75) (-1.60) (-1.27) (0.02) (0.55) (-1.23) (-0.98)
CEO ownership -1.8048 0.4657 -1.8711
(-4.18) (1.23) (-4.86)
CEO tenure -0.0075 -0.0051 -0.0061
(-2.69) (-2.34) (-2.35)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0366 0.0416 0.0397
(5.07) (3.53) (5.94)
Institutional ownership 0.0279 0.0338 0.0837
(0.40) (0.42) (1.37)




Number of analysts -0.0013
(2.10)
S&P 500 membership 0.0034
(2.12)
R
2 0.462 0.095 0.088 0.139 0.161
N 8,610 8,610 6,571 8,610 6,740 7,927 6,658
46Table 7
Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading: Alternative
Estimation Methods
Estimates of regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors using alternative estimation
methods are shown. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates of median (least-absolute deviation) panel regression.
Columns (3) and (4) presents estimates of cross-sectional regression using the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Refer
to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries
are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for
ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median Fama-
regression MacBeth
Probability of informed trading (PIN) -2.2345 -1.8275 -1.1203 -0.8144
(-9.36) (-6.14) (-7.71) (-3.37)
Firm size (log) 0.0115 -0.0024 0.0175 0.0126
(1.17) (-0.20) (2.74) (1.60)
Leverage 0.5376 0.3759 0.4690 0.3486
(9.04) (5.38) (13.19) (7.78)
Firm age (log) 0.1736 0.1252 0.1562 0.1042
(12.97) (6.87) (13.55) (11.59)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0766 0.0638 0.0926 0.0798
(4.54) (3.41) (8.70) (6.00)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0137 0.0238 -0.0078 0.0237
(0.79) (1.17) (-0.45) (1.59)
R&D expenditures -0.1276 -0.2050 0.7357 0.4601
(-0.46) (-0.61) (4.35) (4.53)
Stock return variance -0.0068 -0.0229 -0.3434 -0.4132
(-0.13) (-0.36) (-4.57) (-3.69)
Free cash ﬂow 0.0793 0.0606 -0.0061 -0.2502
(0.45) (0.29) (-0.05) (-1.38)
Return-on-assets -0.3578 -0.5427 -0.3193 -0.2341
(-1.78) (-2.26) (-2.33) (-1.83)
CEO ownership -2.0375 -1.9228
(-7.31) (-6.79)
CEO tenure -0.0066 -0.0063
(-3.60) (-4.97)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0359 0.0393
(8.03) (18.56)
Institutional ownership 0.0865 -0.0046
(1.88) (-0.12)




N 8,610 6,740 8,610 6,740
47Table 8
Board Independence and Probability of Informed Trading: Additional Robustness Checks
Estimates of OLS panel regression on the logistic transformed fraction of independent directors, the log fraction of independent directors (column (3)), and the fraction of
independent directors (column (4)) are shown. Refer to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries are omitted
(SIC 6000-6999). Regressions include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IRRC Compact Board Board All Outside Industry Earnings Board
1996-2001 Disclosure indep. (log) indep. blockholders blockholders Herﬁndahl quality size
Probability of informed trading (PIN) -0.9069 -0.8999 -0.3606 -0.1909 -0.8460 -0.9136 -1.5469 -1.2802 -1.5258
(-2.52) (-3.17) (-4.06) (-2.86) (-2.30) (-2.47) (-5.18) (-4.43) (-4.94)
Firm size (log) 0.0201 0.0228 0.0054 0.0055 0.0190 0.0223 0.0214 0.0254 0.0053
(1.21) (1.47) (1.24) (1.66) (1.15) (1.35) (1.38) (1.57) (0.31)
Leverage 0.2787 0.3029 0.0879 0.0735 0.2771 0.2737 0.3264 0.4203 0.2973
(2.52) (2.85) (2.75) (3.24) (2.51) (2.47) (3.06) (3.85) (2.63)
Firm age (log) 0.1123 0.0957 0.0205 0.0138 0.1128 0.1204 0.1066 0.1079 0.1026
(4.01) (3.62) (2.59) (2.46) (3.96) (4.21) (4.13) (3.81) (3.60)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0684 0.1082 0.0258 0.0127 0.0683 0.0675 0.0849 0.1098 0.0988
(2.93) (4.30) (4.18) (2.55) (2.91) (2.88) (3.63) (4.38) (4.08)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0078 0.0434 0.0081 0.0059 0.0074 0.0098 0.0185 0.0102 0.0261
(0.28) (1.78) (1.17) (1.14) (0.26) (0.34) (0.73) (0.40) (0.98)
R&D expenditures 0.2971 0.2050 -0.0451 -0.0270 0.2939 0.2938 -0.0779 -0.0544 0.1237
(0.64) (0.45) (-0.35) (-0.28) (0.63) (0.63) (-0.18) (-0.12) (0.29)
Stock return variance -0.0925 -0.0869 0.0227 -0.0071 -0.0856 -0.0903 -0.0325 -0.0031 0.0320
(-1.44) (-1.35) (1.30) (-0.50) (-1.34) (-1.42) (-0.52) (-0.04) (0.48)
Free cash ﬂow 0.2321 -0.2222 0.0303 -0.0206 0.2401 0.2377 0.1363 0.0227 0.0833
(0.77) (-0.72) (0.32) (-0.31) (0.79) (0.79) (0.45) (0.07) (0.27)
Return-on-assets -0.3563 -0.1136 -0.0615 -0.0117 -0.3836 -0.3784 -0.4132 -0.1770 -0.3244
(-1.03) (-0.32) (-0.57) (-0.15) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.20) (-0.47) (-0.92)
CEO ownership -2.0585 -1.7194 -0.5215 -0.3082 -2.0476 -1.9487 -1.8687 -1.7319 -1.6205
(-4.36) (-4.68) (-4.10) (-3.74) (-4.34) (-4.12) (-4.90) (-3.83) (-4.28)
CEO tenure -0.0092 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0059 -0.0060 -0.0059
(-3.05) (-0.24) (-1.47) (-1.64) (-3.08) (-3.06) (-2.29) (-2.20) (-2.27)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0392 0.0512 0.0113 0.0071 0.0386 0.0377 0.0400 0.0416 0.0396
(5.14) (7.64) (5.81) (4.95) (5.09) (4.93) (6.01) (5.90) (5.69)
Institutional ownership 0.0120 0.0756 0.0278 0.0149 0.0741 0.1257 0.1189
(0.19) (1.21) (1.81) (1.14) (1.22) (1.96) (1.85)
Institutional Herﬁndahl 0.2839 0.1286 0.0557 0.0655 0.1868 0.3304 0.1748
(1.15) (0.49) (0.75) (1.31) (0.73) (1.02) (0.67)
Blockholders ownership 0.0195
(0.20)






Board size (lag) 0.0172
(2.14)
R2 0.169 0.153 0.143 0.088 0.168 0.172 0.164 0.185 0.170
N 4,504 6,029 6,896 7,034 4,504 4,504 6,740 5,710 6,175
48Table 9
Board Independence and Alternative Measures of Price Informativeness
Estimates of OLS panel regression on alternative price informativeness measures are shown. Columns (1) and (2)
use the logistic transformed relative ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation as dependent variable. Columns (5) and (6) use
the logarithm of the illiquidity measure of Amihud (price impact). Refer to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The
sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions
include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-speciﬁc return variation (logistic) -0.0877 -0.0699
(-4.88) (-3.74)
Illiquidity (log) -0.0829 -0.0722
(-6.96) (-4.46)
Firm size (log) 0.0748 0.0549 -0.0208 -0.0285
(7.23) (4.83) (-1.07) (-1.25)
Leverage 0.2839 0.1913 0.3264 0.2227
(3.79) (2.29) (4.46) (2.72)
Firm age (log) 0.1417 0.0942 0.1500 0.1059
(8.64) (4.68) (9.22) (5.19)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0996 0.0676 0.1111 0.0825
(4.92) (3.29) (5.42) (4.10)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0137 0.0292 -0.0262 0.0063
(0.85) (1.60) (-1.40) (0.30)
RD expenditures 0.9549 0.6470 0.6232 0.3124
(4.47) (2.58) (2.85) (1.23)
Stock return variance -0.0266 -0.0209
(-0.83) (-0.57)
Free cash ﬂow 0.4644 0.2125 0.6486 0.4124
(2.09) (0.88) (2.94) (1.70)
Return-on-assets -0.9283 -0.5958 -1.0350 -0.7580
(-3.80) (-2.28) (-4.17) (-2.85)
CEO ownership -1.9371 -1.9263
(-6.52) (-6.28)
CEO tenure -0.0048 -0.0056
(-2.26) (-2.63)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0404 0.0394
(7.49) (7.29)
Institutional ownership 0.0890 0.0504
(1.76) (0.97)
Institutional Herﬁndahl 0.0600 0.3010
(0.29) (1.41)
R
2 0.151 0.159 0.159 0.162
N 11,755 9,460 12,964 9,168
49Table 10
Board Structure and Probability of Informed Trading: Number of Meetings,
Director Attendance, and Board Size
Estimates of OLS panel regression on the logarithm of the number of board meetings, the fraction of directors with
board attendance problems, and the logarithm of board size are shown. Refer to Table 1 for variables deﬁnition. The
sample consists of IRRC ﬁrms from 1990 to 2001. Financial industries are omitted (SIC 6000-6999). Regressions
include industry and year dummies. Robust t-statistics adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of board Board attendance Board
meetings (log) problems size (log)
Probability of informed trading -0.3878 -0.3773 0.0477 0.0500 -0.2942 -0.2514
(-2.08) (-1.99) (2.11) (2.12) (-2.51) (-1.97)
Firm size (log) 0.0415 0.0390 0.0018 0.0018 0.0844 0.0870
(5.06) (4.57) (2.30) (2.22) (16.84) (15.61)
Leverage 0.0965 0.0984 0.0050 0.0032 0.1183 0.0735
(1.82) (1.77) (0.96) (0.59) (3.37) (2.03)
Firm age (log) 0.0316 0.0147 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0676 0.0581
(2.87) (1.05) (-0.19) (-0.61) (8.19) (5.86)
Number of business segments (log) 0.0272 0.0161 0.0011 0.0013 0.0295 0.0182
(2.15) (1.26) (0.84) (0.98) (3.19) (2.00)
Market-to-book (log) 0.0054 -0.0024 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0457 -0.0415
(0.47) (-0.20) (0.10) (0.28) (-5.11) (-4.43)
RD expenditures 0.0571 0.2602 0.0249 0.0370 -0.5089 -0.6790
(0.24) (1.06) (0.99) (1.34) (-2.89) (-3.57)
Stock return variance 0.1895 0.1618 0.0023 0.0005 -0.1330 -0.1184
(3.98) (3.45) (0.52) (0.11) (-4.54) (-3.59)
Free cash ﬂow 0.0262 0.0297 0.0257 0.0253 0.0892 0.0984
(0.17) (0.17) (1.97) (1.77) (0.86) (0.85)
Return-on-assets -0.4269 -0.4495 -0.0279 -0.0189 -0.3287 -0.3241
(-2.51) (-2.43) (-1.78) (-1.11) (-2.73) (-2.49)
CEO ownership -0.5782 -0.0568 -0.5043
(-2.59) (-2.94) (-2.95)
CEO tenure -0.0045 0.0003 0.0006
(-3.14) (2.28) (0.62)
Governance index (GIM) 0.0043 -0.0003 0.0107
(1.17) (-0.90) (4.25)
Institutional ownership -0.0878 -0.0118 -0.0486
(-2.52) (-3.25) (-2.13)
Institutional Herﬁndahl -0.0524 0.0331 0.1663
(-0.36) (2.22) (1.79)
R2 0.091 0.110 0.006 0.011 0.329 0.333
N 4,827 4,236 5,031 4,744 8,923 7,034
50Figure 1. Board Independence by Probability of Informed Trading Quintiles.
This ﬁgure plots means of fraction of independent directors by probability of informed trading
(PIN) quintiles for the period from 1990 to 2001.
51